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Abstract: In order to communicate the risk of fraudulent e-mails to users properly, it
is important to know which aspects they focus on when evaluating the trustworthiness
of an e-mail. To that end, a study was conducted to test predictions derived from a
decision model by asking participants how they would react to each of eight e-mails
and why. The study confirms results from previous research showing that content as
well as visual and linguistic aspects, but also technical aspects such as sender address
and link URL are considered by recipients. It also adds new findings like the fact
that through experience and education, users form rules such as “A bank will never
ask you for account details via e-mail” or the fact that attachments in HTML format
or implausible sending times raise suspicions in users. These findings can be used to
inform the design of anti-fraud education and user interfaces of e-mail clients.
1 Introduction
One of the most prominent risks of e-mail communication is the exposure to malicious
e-mails which aim to trick recipients into giving away sensitive information (phishing),
transferring money (e.g. the so-called “Nigerian” or “419” scam [SW11]) or opening
malicious attachments. In order to support users in protecting themselves from these risks,
they have to be communicated to them either through preventive education or through
the user interface of (web, desktop or mobile) e-mail clients. To optimally target these
communication efforts, it is important to first learn which aspects users focus on when
deciding how to react to an e-mail, in order to identify in which aspects their behavior
has to be improved. This paper covers a study which aims to both confirm results from
previous research which on this topic and to uncover aspects relevant to users which have
not been documented yet.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the model we created and which
this study is based on, and the research questions derived from it. Section 3 documents
the methods used in the study, the results of which are detailed in section 4 and discussed
in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper and offers an outlook on the application of the
results and on further research.
2 Background and Research Questions
The study presented in this paper is based on a model to predict recipients’ reactions to
calls to action contained in online messages, which was presented by Pfeiffer, Theuerling
and Kauer [PTK13]. That model is based on results from previous research on user re-
actions to e-mails and websites from both the social engineering and e-commerce fields
(see aforementioned paper for details, as they do not fit into this paper’s space limit). It
contains several sets of variables that influence recipients’ reactions: attributes of the mes-
sage, attributes of the purported sender, attributes of context, knowledge/experience of
recipient, demographic attributes of recipient, and personality traits of the recipient. Using
interviews, the study presented in this paper focuses on the attributes of the message and
purported sender as well as contextual factors which influence recipients’ reactions.
The attributes of the message predicted to influence reactions are URLs of links (including
whether they start with https), the subject line, design aspects such as company/brand logos
and colors, trust seals, language (including spelling and grammar errors), personalization
(such as inclusion of the recipient’s name or account number), the presence of a footer with
company and legal information, the overall narrative strength of the e-mail’s content, the
quality of the (additional) information and content provided in the e-mail, a perceived per-
suasion attempt, and perceived privacy and security protection communicated through the
e-mail. The aspects of the e-mail’s (purported) sender which are predicted to influence re-
cipients’ reactions are the name and address in the “from” field, familiarity with (receiving
e-mails from) the sender, as well as the (purported) sender’s reputation. Contextual aspects
are the contextual plausibility of the e-mail (for example whether an order the message is
referring to was actually placed by the recipient). Another contextual aspect, recipient’s
computer’s perceived vulnerability to attacks, is not expected to be of relevance to partici-
pants of this study because it presents a fictitious scenario where participants cannot assess
the computer’s vulnerability.
3 Methods
The study took place in 2013 in a lab at the Technische Universität Darmstadt and con-
sisted of a questionnaire before and interviews after participants were shown examples of
authentic and fraudulent e-mails. It was one part of a larger setup which also included
eye tracking and the presentation of e-commerce websites (all of which were authentic).
Due to space limitations, this paper only reports the results from the interviews. After
an introduction, participants filled in an online questionnaire. It contains questions on
socio-demographic information (age, gender, educational level and monthly household in-
come) as well as experience with and usage of the Internet and electronic devices, and the
familiarity with software used in the study.
After completing the questionnaire, participants were shown eight different e-mails in
Portable Document Format in randomized order, each of them twice. PDFs had to be
used due to restrictions in the eye tracking software. The set of e-mails consist of four
authentic commercial e-mails and four real-world phishing examples. If they contain links
whose URL is not directly visible, it is included at the bottom of the PDF since it is not
possible to use mouse-over to see the URL in the PDF. Except for the fraudulent e-mail
purportedly from Facebook (written in English), the e-mails are written in German. In the
following descriptions, text is translated.
Table 1 and 2 detail the characteristics of the e-mails with regard to the features mentioned
in section 2, tables 3 and 4 do the same for the fraudulent ones. URLs are shortened to the
domain names (or other domain names contained elsewhere in the URL).
Purp. sender comdirect bank Amazon Marketplace
“From” address comdirect.postbox@noreply.
comdirect.de
Solution 21 - Amazon Market-
place <chp00fxqpq4225@ mar-
ketplace.amazon.de>
Subject PostBox: You have received a
new financial report
Receipt-201216235
Link URLs www.comdirect.de www.amazon.de/...,
www.adobe.com/...
Design/layout Plain text Plain text
Language Professional, no errors Professional, no errors
Form of address Impersonal Impersonal
Signature comdirect bank AG Kind regards
Other personaliz. Last 3 digits of account-no. None
Footer Company info with link to web-
site
None
Story Information about available fi-
nancial report
Information about invoice incl.
number and date (no need for
payment implied)
Call to action Go to personal area on website
(no link)
None (implicit: read invoice)
Additional info Best bank award Info on Adobe Reader required
to read PDF incl. download link
Priv./Sec. info Info can be unsubscribed from Info on secure online purchas-
ing, security and anonymity
features of Amazon Market-
place e-mail system
Attachment None Invoice-201216235-16307.pdf
Table 1: Features of Authentic E-mails
When seeing the e-mails for the first time, participants were instructed to look at them
carefully and form an opinion about them (while there eye movement was being tracked).
After that, the same e-mail was shown a second time and the experimenter asked them
how they would have reacted to the e-mail and for which reasons, as well as which fea-
tures of it they noticed and whether they have influenced their opinion. The e-mails were
shown twice in order to separate the eye-tracking from the interview part but still allow
participants to point out the aspects they looked at in the e-mails. Their answers were
Purp. sender Zalando Facebook
“From” address Zalando Team
<team@info.zalando.de>
Facebook <update+kjdmww
jmvi5m@facebookmail.com>
Subject Your new password at Zalando Juli, you have unread notifica-
tions
Link URLs www.zalando.de/... www.facebook.com/login.php/...,
www.facebook.com/o.php/...
Design/layout Logo, fonts, colors, two trust
seals
Facebook logo and other icons
Language Professional, no errors Informal, no errors
Form of address Personal Personal
Signature Kind regards, your Zalando
team
None
Other personaliz. None E-mail addr. contained in login
link
Footer Detailed comp. and contact info Postal address
Story Link to reset password at user’s
request
Info about unread notifications
Call to action Click link, enter new password Click link to read messages
Additional info Link only valid for 24h, adver-
tisements
None
Priv./Sec. info None Info for unsubscribing from
news service
Attachment None None
Table 2: Features of Authentic E-mails Part 2
noted down in shortened form by the experimenter. Afterwards, participants were shown
the e-commerce websites and filled out a second questionnaire. These parts, however, are
not relevant to the results presented in this paper, since they happened after these results
were gathered.
Participants were recruited by Julia Roeth from her private and academic social networks.
There was no compensation for participating in the study, participation was completely
voluntary.
4 Results
4.1 Sample
The study had a total of 34 participants, eight of which were female. The age ranged from
20 to 66, with a median of 25 years. One participant had an intermediate school-leaving
certificate, two had a qualification for entrance to universities of applied science. Fifteen
Purp. sender Facebook Bank
“From” address Facebook administration <hee-
donghong@ftp3.scmedia.com.hk>
Bob Daslamm <bob-
daslamm@gmx.de>
Subject ‘You have 1 personal notifica-
tion from Facebook Adminis-
tration
Account blocked, assistance re-
quired
Link URLs http://cp990.perso.sfr.fr/... http://wwwbanksq.biz/?meine.
deutsche-bank.de/...
Design/layout Facebook logo and other icons Plain
Language Informal, no errors Simple, no errors, missing
spaces
Form of address None Impersonal
Signature None MariaWolf
Other personaliz. Part of e-mail address in link None
Footer Postal address None
Story Info: Message from Facebook
administr. waiting for response
Bank account blocked due to
suspicious actions
Call to action Click link to read message Click link to activate update and
restore access
Priv./Sec. info None None
Attachment None None
Table 3: Features of Fraudulent E-mails
participants had a general university entrance qualification, 16 had a degree from a general
university or a university of applied sciences.
All participants used the internet daily. 24 participants had been using the internet for
more than 10 years, nine for 7 to 10 years and one participant for 3 to 7 years.
4.2 Methods of Analysis
The reasons given for the participants’ reactions to each e-mail (from the experimenter’s
notes) were categorized and for each participant and each e-mail it was recorded whether a
category was not mentioned at all, mentioned as supporting the decision or as contradicting
the decision. Then the total number of mentions of each category and the number of
participants which mentioned a category at least once were counted.
4.3 Predicted Features
At first, the aspects predicted by the model to influence the decision (see section 2) are
analyzed. Table 5 illustrates the number of mentions of these features as well as how many
Purp. sender PayPal Visa/Mastercard
“From” address PayPal.de <Service@paypal-
europa.biz>
Visa und Mastercard <ser-
vice@visa.de>
Subject PayPal - account Important message from Visa /
Mastercard
Link URLs http://support.paypal-service-
europa.biz/ .../verify_account
None
Design/layout PayPal logo + colors, icons (all
look cut out)
Plain
Language Professional, only one capit. er-
ror
Low linguistic quality, errors,
encoding problem
Form of address Impersonal Impersonal
Signature None Regards
Other personaliz. Reference number None
Footer Legal and company info None
Story Access to acc. restricted due to
abnormal activities during last
transaction
Credit card suspended due to
unauthorized use
Call to action Click link and enter account
info to verify ownership
Fill credit card info into at-
tached form and send back for
verification
Additional info Info about transaction None
Priv./Sec. info None None
Attachment None Begrenzte_Kreditkarten_bilden.html
(literal translation of re-
stricted_creditcard_form)
Table 4: Features of Fraudulent E-mails Part 2
participants mentioned it at least once, and whether these results support the prediction.
To control for possible learning effects, it shows the number of participants mentioning an
aspect in the first e-mail and in the last e-mail they saw, respectively.
The “from” address was mentioned at least once by almost all participants. Most partic-
ipants simply stated that certain “from” addresses appeared either authentic or dubious
to them. Mostly the addresses in the fraudulent e-mails appeared dubious to participants
because they were inconsistent with the signatory in the content, because they appeared
unprofessional or came from an unexpected top-level domain. However, the cryptic ap-
pearance of the local parts of both the authentic Amazon and Facebook e-mails were men-
tioned as negative aspects by several participants as well. Link URL was also mentioned
by a vast majority of participants. Most participants correctly identified the URLs in the
fraudulent e-mail as suspicious because of domains which did not match the purported
sender or lack of https and the URLs in authentic e-mails as trustworthy because of their
domain names were known or at least fit the purported sender. However, the long cryptic
link URL in the authentic Facebook e-mail was perceived as suspicious by some partic-
ipants as well. Most of the mentions of subject lines were negative comments on the
Feature Mentions Part. Mentioninga Supported?b
“From” Address 116 32 (12/17) +++
Link URL 64 28 (7/10) +++
Subject 7 6 (3/1) +
Design / Layout 73 29 (6/6) +++
Seal 12 10 (1/2) +
Language 38 24 (4/5) +++
Personalization 24 15 (2/2) ++
Signature / Comp. Info 17 12 (2/1) +
Narrative Strength 24 17 (0/3) ++
Information / Cont. Quality 22 13 (4/4) ++
Context 40 28 (4/4) +++
Persuasion Attempt 23 17 (1/3) ++
Privacy/Security Prot. 3 3 (0/0) +
Reputation 1 1 (0/0) -
Familiarity 31 21 (4/0) ++
aIn brackets: Only mentions for the first/last email a participant has seen
b+++ : mentioned by most (24-34) participants, ++ : many (13-23) participants, + : few (2-12) participants,
- : at most one participant
Table 5: Mentions of Factors Predicted to Influence Decision
subject of the e-mail about a blocked account, which was very simplistic and contained a
capitalization error.
Another aspect mentioned by the vast majority of participants was design/layout. Missing
design elements or bad layout were mostly mentioned as negative aspects of most of the
fraudulent e-mails. The design of the Zalando e-mail with strong branding elements was
mentioned as a positive aspect by many participants, but the design of the fraudulent “Pay-
Pal” e-mail was mentioned as a positive aspect by six participants as well, although three
were suspicious about the authenticity of the logo. Mentions of trust seals were mostly
concerning the presence of e-commerce trust seals as a positive aspect of the Zalando
e-mail.
Language was mostly mentioned as negative aspects of most of the fraudulent e-mails
due to their spelling and grammar mistakes and poor language in general, and as positive
aspects of the authentic e-mails. The “personalization” category contains positive men-
tions of personal form of address or negative mentions of a lack thereof, as well positive
mentions of the invoice number in the Amazon e-mail or the last digits of the account
number in the comdirect e-mail. Mentions of the company information in the comdirect
and Zalando e-mails, the lack of a personal signature and company information in the
Visa/Mastercard e-mail and the mismatch between signatory name and sender address in
the blocked account e-mail were categorized as “Signature / Company Information”. The
category “Narrative Strength” contains descriptions of e-mail content as (im)plausible, au-
thentic/dubious, (not) making sense, but also explicit mentions that Visa and Mastercard
are two different companies and therefore there cannot be an e-mail from both combined.
Comments about the amount and quality of general/supplemental information provided
in e-mails was categorized as “Information / Content Quality”. Especially the extensive
information in the Zalando e-mail was praised by five participants, but also criticized by
two. Three participants praised the information given in the purported PayPal e-mail.
Context was another aspect that the vast majority of participants mentioned at least once.
That category consists mostly of participants mentioning that they would click the link in
the Zalando e-mail or open the PDF attached to the Amazon e-mail if they had requested
a password reset or placed the order mentioned, respectively. Four participants mentioned
they would only go to the comdirect website if they had an account with them. The ma-
jority of the comments in the “Perceived Persuasion Attempt” category came from par-
ticipants who either rejected the purported PayPal e-mail because it urged them to click a
link and enter their login data (five participants), or who praised the comdirect or Amazon
e-mails for being only informative in nature.
Of the three mentions of privacy/security protection, two are concerning the explanation
of the privacy-preserving mechanisms in Amazon Marketplace’s e-mail system, the third
concerns the link to unsubscribe from notifications in the authentic Facebook e-mail. The
only mention of reputation was one participant mentioning that she trusts Amazon. The
last aspect which was predicted to influence decisions is familiarity with (receiving e-
mails from) the sender. Comments in this category were from people who were cautious
due to being unfamiliar with receiving that kind of e-mails from that sender (Amazon
or Facebook), who trusted the Zalando e-mail because they recognized the logo from
commercials, or who ignored or deleted e-mails because they have often received simi-
lar spam/phishing e-mails.
4.4 Exploratory Analysis
The analysis of the qualitative data found additional categories of aspects mentioned as af-
fecting the decisions. Table 6 illustrates those additional aspects each with its total number
of mentions and the number of participants mentioning it.
Aspect No. of Mentions Total No. of Part. Mentioninga
Encoding/Spaces 21 18 (3/3)
Time sent 7 6 (1/0)
Attachment 25 20 (1/4)
Advertisements 7 7 (2/0)
Limitation on Link 3 3 (0/0)
Curiosity 9 6 (1/0)
General Rule/Caution 81 31 (10/9)
aIn brackets: Only mentions for the first/last email a participant has seen
Table 6: Frequencies of Additional Aspects Influencing Decisions
“Encoding/Spaces” refers to the encoding errors in the Visa/Mastercard e-mail and to the
missing spaces between some words in the account suspension e-mail, which participants
mentioned as affecting credibility negatively. “Time sent” refers to participants finding the
time at which the Visa/Mastercard e-mail was sent (midnight) suspicious. “Attachments”
refers to participants mentioning either that they found the HTML file attached to the
purported Visa/Mastercard mail to be suspicious or that the PDF receipt attached to the
Amazon e-mail appeared either trustworthy or suspicious to them. Advertisements mostly
refers to participants mentioning the advertisements in the password reset e-mail from
Zalando as annoying and uncalled-for in this context, whereas the fact that the link for
resetting the password was only valid for 24 hours (“Limitation on Link”) was mentioned
as a positive aspect by three participants. If participants asked themselves questions like
“Where will I get when I click the link?” and said they would click the link to find out, or
if they indicated they would click the link and then investigate the site closely, or that they
might click the link in the Facebook e-mail to see the news, those reasons were categorized
as “Curiosity”. The category “General Rule/Caution” contains reasons like “I never read
e-mails from Facebook”, “Banking is a delicate matter” or “A bank adviser would call me
on the phone”. With 81 overall mentions and 31 out of 34 participants mentioning it at
least once, General Rule/Caution turned out to be the second-most prominent category of
reasons overall.
5 Discussion
All of the attributes of the message, sender or context that were predicted to influence
the intention to follow a call to action contained in an e-mail were indeed mentioned by
participants. The “from” address, design, link URL, context and language were the most
prominent ones. The purported sender’s reputation, however, was mentioned only once,
perceived privacy/security protection was mentioned only by three participants.
The prediction that the purported sender’s reputation affects the recipient’s trust and in-
tention to follow a call to action was mostly derived from e-commerce literature, where
reputation and brand have a large impact on willingness to purchase from a website. It
could be argued that since the e-mails shown in this experiment were directed at existing
customers, participants imagined they were existing customers of the purported senders.
According to the two-stage model by McKnight et al. [MCK00], reputation only affects
consumer’s trust in the early, exploratory phase and is displaced by actual usage experi-
ence afterwards. However, the results from this study still contradict previous studies in
the phishing context [KAC06], where participants did indicate that the purported sender’s
reputation/brand is important for their decision to trust them.
The fact that perceived privacy/security protection was mentioned only by three partici-
pants can be explained by the fact that the e-mails used here do not mention those pro-
tections in direct relation to the calls to action. They only contain links to unsubscribing
from notifications (Facebook) or information about privacy and security protection in the
e-mail system in general (Amazon). In this light, it is interesting to see that three partici-
pants still mentioned the general privacy-related information as contributing to their trust
in the e-mail and/or its sender. The subject line was mentioned by only six participants.
This could be due to the fact that participants were directly presented with the full e-mail,
whereas in reality, the subject line is more relevant before an e-mail has been opened, at
least in e-mail clients which allow deleting an e-mail without viewing its body.
There were also reasons mentioned which were not predicted. While the encoding prob-
lems in one e-mail which were mentioned by many participants were specific to this par-
ticular e-mail, other reasons apply to other e-mails as well. The advertisements mentioned
by seven participants as a negative aspect of the Zalando e-mail indicate that they did not
expect an e-mail with a link to reset the account password to contain ads. The time when
it was sent is another attribute which was not found to influence credibility of an e-mail
before. Curiosity, which was interpreted as the reason behind the decision to click a link
by six participants, was not found as a reason for following calls to action in previous
studies, but Wainer et al. [WDK11] found it as an important factor for reading e-mails in
general.
The most important unpredicted reason, however, was a general rule or caution. 31 of our
34 participants gave reasons in this category. That this was not found in previous studies
can be explained by the fact that previous studies either focused on experimentally ma-
nipulated attributes of the e-mail, measured personality traits or asked participants for the
reason why they thought an e-mail was authentic or not (which would not reveal general
rules such as “I never read e-mails from Facebook” which relate to behavior, though they
could have revealed rules such as “A bank adviser would call me on the phone”). These
general rules may have been acquired through general anti-phishing education or from
banks’ explicit information to their customers (or, in the case of Facebook, result from the
fact that users do not find these messages useful because they regularly log into Facebook
anyway). Another reason mentioned by the majority of participants were attachments.
Although previous quantitative phishing research has used e-mails with attachments as
stimuli [DJCF07], we know of no study were they were mentioned by participants of qual-
itative studies.
Before discussing the implications of this study’s results, its limitations of course have to
be considered. First of all, this being a laboratory experiment, the situation participants
were in differed from real-life e-mail reading situations in several aspects. Participants
were observed both by the eye tracker camera and the experimenter while reading the e-
mails, which may have put them under pressure to be extra careful (although they were
not told that their task was to distinguish between authentic and fraudulent e-mails). The
fact that even under these conditions, three out of 34 participants would have clicked the
link in the e-mail purportedly from PayPal, however, indicates that participants were not
overly cautious. Since participants were able to see the e-mail while being asked about
what had led them to their reaction, they may have noticed features of it which they had
not noticed before. Therefore, the importance of some aspects for user’s decisions may
be overestimated. This is particularly true for the link URL, which was always visible at
the bottom of the e-mail, whereas in reality, it is only seen when the mouse cursor hovers
over the link. To make the situation more realistic, actual HTML e-mails viewed in web
browsers or e-mail clients will be used in future studies.
Seeing eight e-mails in succession could theoretically have introduced learning effects. As
shown in tables 5 and 6, however, the number of mentions remained relatively stable be-
tween the first and last e-mail seen for most aspects. The only aspects being mentioned by
disproportionately few participants for the first e-mail were narrative strength, persuasion
attempt and attachment. Familiarity, on the other hand, was mentioned by disproportion-
ately few participants for the last e-mail. Whether these results reflect actual learning
effects has to be investigated in further studies. Another limitation to generalization is the
composition of the sample. Although we were able to sample a relatively wide range of age
and education groups, a majority of participants were still university students. Therefore,
the sample is not representative of all e-mail users.
For these reasons, the actual proportion of successful attacks in this study should not be
generalized to real-world proportions.
6 Conclusion and Outlook
Overall, the results from this study are largely in line with the model and thus with previous
research. They show that recipients base their decision whether to follow a call to action
contained in an e-mail on aspects of design, content, language, but also on more technical
aspects like the “from” address, link URL or the time it was sent. The fact that the phishing
e-mail that purported to come from PayPal tricked three of our participants into believing
it was authentic and clicking the link to enter their account data demonstrates that even
in 2013, a phishing e-mail which is well written, contains graphical elements from the
original brand and presents a convincing narrative can still be dangerous.
Providing users with general rules such as “A bank will never ask you for account details
via e-mail” is confirmed to be effective in protecting them from at least some phishing at-
tacks. Apparently, banks have been more effective than PayPal in teaching their customers
such rules, and the results from this study emphasize the importance of improving their
risk communication efforts.
Apart from general rules, another important result is that either users should be taught to
pay less attention to design aspects or that the design elements should be hidden by default
when displaying e-mails from unknown addresses or with other automatically identifiable
suspicious attributes (which some e-mail clients already do) to prevent them from distract-
ing users from more reliable indicators of authenticity.
The fact that context played a major role in participants’ trust decisions emphasizes the
danger of spear phishing [WHC+12], which abuses this reliance on context by targeting
recipients based on information gathered on the web (for example finding out the e-mail
address of an ebay user who is bidding on an auction which is about to end and sending
him or her an e-mail about that auction). It therefore has to be communicated to e-mail
users that a fitting context does not guarantee that an e-mail is authentic.
The central contribution of this study to research in this area is demonstrating that the
question participants are asked can limit or enhance the insights gained from their answers.
General rules or curiosity as reasons for why users do or don’t follow calls to action in
e-mails cannot be found when asking users to decide whether an e-mail is authentic or
fraudulent and give reasons for that decision. This should be kept in mind whenever open
questions seek to find new reasons instead of just confirming known ones.
With interviews as its main method, this study was well-suited to focus on the aspects of
the message which influence the recipient’s decision. Other aspects of the model such
as personality traits or knowledge and experience have to be evaluated in quantitative
studies. A further iteration of the study presented in this paper could aim for improved
generalizability by putting participants in a situation which is closer to real life. However,
a potential bias caused by participants’ reflection on their own thought processes – which
is necessary for qualitative studies – can never be completely avoided.
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